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REVELATION AND PROGRESS. 
THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS 
 FROM STEUCO TO LEIBNIZ1 
ABSTRACT: Leibniz’s concept of the history of philosophy is that of a philosophia perennis: 
The essential truths of philosophy have always been and will always be in the world and 
can be found in every philosophical system in history. While Leibniz with philosophia 
perennis takes up a term coined by Agostino Steuco (1497-1548), which stands 
emblematically for a typical Renaissance topos, he modifies it in a characteristic manner: 
True philosophy is not, as for the Renaissance authors, revealed by God once and for all in 
the beginning of the world, but mankind must approach it in a gradual manner. The 
primordial truths, therefore, are not the ideal form of knowledge, which needs to be 
preserved, but semina veritatis, which need to grow; Leibniz’s philosophia perennis is thus 
not a “conservative” conception, but implies eternal progress. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Leibniz versteht die Geschichte der Philosophie als Philosophia perennis: 
Die entscheidenden Wahrheiten der Philosophie waren immer und werden immer in der Welt 
sein und können in jedem philosophischen System der Geschichte gefunden werden. Während 
Leibniz mit der Philosophia perennis einen von Agostino Steuco (1497-1548) geprägten Begriff 
aufgreift, der emblematisch für einen typischen Topos der Renaissance steht, modifiziert er das 
Gemeinte in charakteristischer Weise: Die wahre Philosophie ist ihm zufolge nicht – wie für 
die Renaissance – ein für alle Mal von Gott offenbart worden; vielmehr muss sich die 
Menschheit ihr graduell annähern. Die primordialen Wahrheiten sind darum nicht die 
                                                                          
1 While working on this article, I benefitted from the hospitality of the Leibniz- 
Forschungsstelle, University of Münster. I am grateful to Dr Stefan Lorenz and the 
anonymous reviewers for several helpful hints, to Dr Rita Widmaier for sharing her 
articles with me, and to Dr Geoff Mills for many linguistic improvements. The 
translations quoted, if not otherwise indicated, are my own. 
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ideale Form des Wissens, die unbedingt zu bewahren ist, sondern Semina veritatis, die 
wachsen können und müssen; Leibnizens Philosophia perennis ist insofern keine 
„konservative“ Konzeption, sondern impliziert ewigen Fortschritt. 
KEYWORDS: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Agostino Steuco; philosophia perennis; prisca 
theologia; Progress; Natural Theology 
Leibniz’s concept of the history of philosophy, it is universally agreed, is 
that of a philosophia perennis: The essential truths of philosophy have 
always been and will always be in the world and can be found in every 
philosophical system in history. The doxographical implications of this 
conception have often led interpreters to give it a “conservative”2 or 
relativistic3 interpretation: Leibniz’s philosophia perennis defends certain 
philosophical tenets already held by the ancients e.g. monotheism or the 
immortality of the soul; in that sense it denies the superiority of modernity. 
The popularity of the concept amongst Thomist or broadly Catholic 
thinkers of the 20th century4 has certainly contributed to this interpretation. 
In this article, I will read philosophia perennis not as a doxographical 
programme of theological metaphysics, but rather as a concept of the history 
of this metaphysics: Instead of the content Leibniz saw as “perennial 
philosophy”, I will focus on the way he thought this content was passed on 
through history. From this point of view, I will compare Leibniz’s 
conception to his source for the term i.e. Agostino Steuco’s 1540 De perenni 
philosophia libri X. While Steuco, a Catholic bishop and papal librarian with 
Platonist views, does indeed believe that philosophy is the truer the older it 
is, Leibniz, we will see, gives the concept a characteristic turn such that it no 
longer warrants its “conservative” classification. 
                                                                          
2 W. Schmidt-Biggemann, “Leibniz konservativ interpretiert: Der letzte Vertreter 
der Philosophia perennis”, in Leibniz und Europa, VI. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongreß 
unter der Schirmherrschaft des Niedersächsischen Ministerpräsidenten Gerhard 
Schröder, Vorträge II, Teil, Hannover, 18. bis 23. Juli 1994, Hannover, 1995, p. 265-282; 
auch in Id., Apokalypse und Philologie. Wissensgeschichte und Weltentwürfe in der Frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. by Anja Hallacker and Boris Bayer, Göttingen, 2007, p. 289-299. 
3 E. Terzaga, “Philosophia perennis. Comentario a la carta a Rémond del 26 de 
agosto de 1714”, in Q. Racionero (ed.), G. W. Leibniz: analogia y expresion, Madrid, 1995, 
p. 485-492. 
4  C. B. Schmitt, “Perennial philosophy. From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz”, Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 27, 1966, p. 506. 
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Steuco, a Renaissance polemicist against Lutheranism, Aristotelianism 
and university theology,5 coined the term philosophia perennis, but the 
concept it refers to is much older.6 At its core is the idea that Greek 
philosophy is rooted in the archaic thought of the East: Appearing first 
with the ancient legends that Pythagoras and Solon studied in Egypt,7 later 
gaining more importance when early Christian apologists, inspired by the 
Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria, declared Moses the founder of the 
philosophical tradition,8 this tradition became a central paradigm for the 
interpretation of the history of philosophy in the Early Modern age: The 
superiority of Pre-Socratic and Oriental thought over classical philosophy 
was clear for thinkers as important to Leibniz as Francis Bacon, Johann 
Heinrich Alsted,9 and Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld.10 The popular current 
of Cabbalism, with which Leibniz himself had to deal,11 also sought to 
draw perennial wisdom from ancient texts and, since Pico della Mirandola, 
could be integrated into the philosophia perennis narrative. The paradigm 
suited well the general temper of Early Modern scholarship, which – from 
                                                                          
5 G. Di Napoli, “Il concetto di ‘philosophia perennis’ di Agostino Steuco nel quadro 
della tematica rinascimentale”, in Filosofia e cultura in Umbria tra Medioevo e 
Rinascimento, Atti del IV convegno di Studi Umbri, Gubbio, 22-26 maggio 1966, 
Gubbio/Perugia, 1967, esp. p. 477.  
6 Cf. Schmitt, “Perennial philosophy”, p. 507-514; R. Widmaier, “Leibniz’ 
natürliche Theologie und eine ‘gewisse’ Philosophia perennis”, in W. Li et al. (eds.), Für 
unser Glück oder das Glück anderer, Vorträge des X. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses 
Hannover, 18.-23. Juli 2016, 6 vols., Hildesheim, 2016-2017, p. 586-589. 
7 Solon’s journey to Egypt is referred to in his own fragments; the legends of 
Pythagoras have come to us (and to Steuco) in Diogenes Laertius’ and Iamblich’s 
biographies, which in turn build on older sources that are now lost. For a full account of 
the sources, cf. von Fritz’s and Aly’s articles in Pauly-Wissowa XLVII / III A, s. v. 
“Pythagoras”/“Solon”. 
8 Examples are Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius of Caesarea: Schmidt-Biggemann, 
Philosophia perennis, p. 59. 
9 T. Leinkauf, “Prisca scientia vs. Prisca sapentia. Zwei Modelle des Umgangs mit der 
Tradition am Beispiel des Rückgriffs auf die Vorsokratik im Kontext der 
frühneuzeitlichen Debatte und der Ausbildung des Kontinuitätsmodells der Prisca 
sapientia bzw. Philosophia perennis”, Mediterranea. International Journal on the Transfer of 
Knowledge, 2, 2017, p. 127f., 143. 
10 J. H. Bisterfeld, Aphorismi Physici, in Id., Bisterfeldius Redivivus, seu oper[a] Joh. 
Henrici Bisterfeldii magni theologi et philosophi posthum[a], 2 vols., Den Haag, 1661, vol. I, 
p. 134. 
11 S. Edel, Die individuelle Substanz bei Böhme und Leibniz, Die Kabbala als tertium 
comparationis für eine rezeptionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Studia Leibnitiana 
Sonderheft, 23), Stuttgart, 1995. 
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Annio da Viterbo’s 1498 Berosus forgery until the dawn of the 19th 
century – saw countless, immensely erudite attempts to blend biblical and 
classical traditions and new philological or antiquarian discoveries into a 
single account of sacred world history, often with a special role reserved for 
the writer’s own nation, but always beginning in the East.12 We still see, in 
fact, a secularised shadow of this idea when Hegel lets the sun of History 
wander from East to West.13 In the classical Renaissance form of the 
philosophia perennis topos, conceived by Ficino and echoed by Reuchlin, 
Patrizi, and others, the chronological and epistemological primacy of 
perennial philosophy coincides with its transcendent origin: The tradition 
of philosophia perennis can be found in the oldest texts and is consonant 
with reason because its origin is a Divine revelation at the beginning of 
history. The history of archaic pagan thought, therefore, had to be blended 
with the Christian revelation narrative of the Old Testament – so that, for 
example, Moses had to become a predecessor of Zoroaster and Hermes 
Trismegistus.14 All of this we find also in Steuco’s narrative. 
The origin of the Great Tradition of perennial philosophy, according 
to Steuco, is to found at the creation already. The first man, he writes, was 
created with a perfectly beautiful body and an even more beautiful soul, 
and was endowed with a full knowledge of God and His creation. In these 
circumstances, of course, Adam and Eve could have talked about nothing 
but theology all day long!15 Following the genealogical accounts of the 
                                                                          
12 On Berosus cf. C. B. Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book. Tacitus’s Germania From the 
Roman Empire to the Third Reich, New York, 2011, p. 98-104; Schmidt-Biggemann, 
Apokalypse und Philologie. p. 331-356. Several examples of this tradition are presented in 
the volume K. A. E. Enenkel-K. A. Ottenheym (eds.), The Quest for an Appropriate Past in 
Literature, Art and Architecture (Intersections 60), Leiden, 2018. According to Leibniz 
himself, mankind (in accordance with the biblical traditions) has its origins in Asia. The 
Europeans descend from the Skythians; the ancient Saxons (predecessors of the Electorate 
of Hannover, where Leibniz was employed) were the oldest of these ‘Skythian’ nations: 
Bodemann (ed.), Leibniz’ Entwürfe (1692), 29-31; E. Bodemann (ed.), “Leibniz’ Entwürfe 
zu seinen Annalen von 1691-1692”, Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen, 
1885; Letter 1692, A I.8, 18; cf. W. Conze, Leibniz als Historiker (Leibniz zu seinem 300, 
Geburtstag, 1646-1946, Lieferung 6), Berlin, 1951, p. 65-73. 
13 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 168f.  
14 T. Leinkauf, Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance, 2 vols., Hamburg, 
2017, II, p. 1227-1238, with a specific characterization of Steuco, p. 1236-1238; cf. Id., 
“Prisca sapientia”, p. 139-143; Id., “Modelle”, p. 183-186. 
15 “Omnem enim magni genitoris illius, ac magnae genitricis sermonem, Theologiam 
fuisse credendum est”– A. Steuco, De perenni philosophia libri X, Lyon, 1540, 4.  
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bible, all of these early men led extremely long lives – Adam, for example, 
died at the age of 930. Steuco calculated, therefore, that Noah would have 
been able to meet the grandchildren of the First Parents, who had spent 
many years with them, had listened to their theological discourses and now 
had much wisdom to share with the generations that followed.16 Noah and 
Abraham’s lives, in turn, even overlapped by 50 years. Thus, much of the 
knowledge that Adam had at the time of the creation could be handed 
down via Noah to Abraham and the Israelites, and more generally to the 
people living in that region of the world where the first humans, both after 
the creation and the deluge, had settled: Armenia, Mesopotamia, 
Chaldea.17 The first philosophical sources surveyed by Steuco are therefore 
the texts known since Proclus as the Chaldean Oracles – attributed, during 
the Renaissance from Gemistus Pletho onward, to Zoroaster (they are 
actually from the 2nd/3rd century CE).18 
The rest of the world, uninhabited first and then increasingly settled 
by the descendants of Noah, was devoid of wisdom and had to import it 
later from the ‘older’ oriental regions. “Barbarian” theology – says Steuco – 
is therefore ‘truer’ than Greek and Roman theology, precisely because it is 
older. The Greeks received their philosophical knowledge from Egypt, 
which is closer to Chaldea and Mesopotamia than their own country. Even 
the art of writing, we can read in the Philebus and Phaedrus, was invented 
by the “Egyptian man” Theut. What Plato has to say about the divine and 
the creation, our author is convinced, comes from Hermes Trismegistus. 
Plato, Solon, Eudoxus and Orpheus himself crossed the sea in order to 
listen to the wisdom of Egyptian priests; Pythagoras as well, who even 
adopted the practise of circumcision from them, and who also lived at 
Mount Carmel in Palestine and visited Arabs and Chaldeans and the magi 
of Persia.19 Most of this – Steuco is right here – is mentioned in ancient 
sources. Only one of many examples Steuco cites is Plato’s famous anecdote 
                                                                          
16 Ibid. 4, with reference to Gen. 5/11. 
17 Ibid., 1-3. 
18 Ibid., 8; cf. Johnston’s article in Der Neue Pauly 9, s.v. “Oracula Chaldaica”; M. 
Stausberg, Faszination Zarathustra. Zoroaster und die Europäische Religionsgeschichte der 
Frühen Neuzeit, 2 Bde. (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 42), Berlin/New 
York, 1998, p. 35-69. 
19 Steuco, De perenni philosophia, 83f.  
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in which the Egyptian priest exclaims: “O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are 
always children: there is not such a thing as an old Greek”.20 
To be sure, the archaic ‘Chaldean’ tradition, based on the original 
revelation to Adam, and handed down via Egypt to Greece and Rome, is 
not the only source of philosophy Steuco acknowledges. The decline of this 
first philosophical tradition gave way to a second, much weaker, era in 
human thought, where philosophy was based on the observation of natural 
phenomena and the inquiry into their causes. Steuco himself – he says – 
lives in a third era, where new light illuminates the world, “healing the 
wounds of the first and uncovering the preposterous judgments of the 
second philosophy”,21 and this third one is “the most eminent of them 
all”:22 The revelation of the Christian era, we are to understand.23 It is only 
this full knowledge of the divine wisdom that enables our author to detect 
vestiges and fragments of truth in the ancient pagan texts that he 
scrutinizes in his work. But the superiority of Christian thought is possible 
only due to a new revelation. The second phase of the history of 
philosophy, based on the autonomous endeavour of the human race to 
understand the functioning of the world, was subject to many flaws and 
could never really find truth.24 Revelation thus seems to be the most 
important and most perfect source of wisdom; if we except the new 
revelation of the Christian era, therefore, philosophy is in principle the 
more perfect the older it is. And these are the points, we will shortly see, 
where Leibniz differs from Steuco. 
                                                                          
20 “ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν”: Plat. Tim. 
22b, trans. W. R. M. Lamb. 
21 “vulnera prioris illius sanavit: mediae praepostera iudicia retexit” – Steuco, De 
perenni philosophia, 6. 
22 Cf. the headline: “De tribus modis, quibus cognita est Sapientia, sed posteriore 
praestantissimo” – ibid. 
23 Cf. S. Alvárez Turienzo, “Révélation, raison et philosophia perennis”, Revue des 
sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 64, 1980, p. 339-341. Steuco is very abstract in this 
chapter and does not mention Christianity explicitly. Di Napoli, “Philosophia perennis”, 
p. 481, understands this third era as the post-Aristotelian Christian Humanism; the 
decisive date would then be the end of the Middle Ages rather than the beginning of the 
Christian era. The enthusiastic light imagery and the implication of a new revelation 
rather speaks against this interpretation; Di Napoli can, however, show that also in a 
Christian context Aristotelianism is, for Steuco, a prototypical representative of the 
second rather than the third wave of philosophy.  
24 Steuco, De perenni philosophia, 3, 6. 
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Steuco’s work is “one of the more prepossessing examples of 
Renaissance erudition and learning, although at times it tends to be 
rambling and repetitive”:25 On each of the central themes of philosophia 
perennis he “unfurls a carpet of quotations from Plato, Aristotle, Philo, 
Hermes Trismegistus, the Chaldaic Oracles, Amelius, Plotinus and 
Proclus”26 – a truly encyclopaedic repertory supposedly proving the 
presence of Christian theology in each of these authors. This achievement 
enjoyed a modest popularity in the 16th and 17th century; prominent figures 
such as Francisco Suárez and Daniel Morhof criticized (Suárez) or praised 
its ideas (Morhof).27 Jacob Thomasius, Leibniz’s professor in Leipzig, who 
emphasizes the role of change and innovation in the history of philosophy28 
and is very critical of the idea of simply identifying the thought of the 
ancients which what we today know to be true, mentions Steuco several 
times as a well-known example of that problematic tendency.29 The 16th 
century author Crispo, whom Thomasius cites, can even “tacitly 
reproach”30 Steuco without naming him: He critically refers to those “qui 
                                                                          
25 Schmitt, “Perennial philosophy”, p. 517. 
26 “der einen Teppich aus Zitaten aus Platon, Aristoteles, Philon, Hermes 
Trismegistos, den Chaldäischen Orakeln, Amelios, Plotin, Proklos etc. ausbreitet” – 
Leinkauf, Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance, II, p. 1236. 
27 Schmitt, “Perennial Philosophy”, p. 516-517, 524-531; characteristic seems also 
his eager reception in Salamanca, cf. Alvárez Turienzo, “Révélation”, p. 335. 
28 Thomasius’s programme is the philosophiae reformatio, which also becomes a key 
paradigm of the young Leibniz in his Mainz years: J. Thomasius, Dissertationes LXIII varii 
argumenti magnam partem ad historiam philosophicam et ecclesiasticam pertinentes, ed. C. 
T. Halle (Saale), 1693, p. 441-443, 473; J. Thomasius, Exercitatio de Stoica mundi 
exustione: Cui accesserunt Argumenti Varii, Sed inprimis ad historiam Stoicae Philosophiae 
facientes, Dissertationes XXI, Leipzig, 1676, p. 20-22, 253; cf. C. Mercer, Leibniz’s 
Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, Cambridge, 2001, p. 101; Ead., “The 
Seventeenth-Century Debate between the Moderns and the Aristotelians: Leibniz and 
Philosophia Reformata”, in I. Marchlewitz-A. Heinekamp (eds.), Leibniz’ 
Auseinandersetzung mit Vorgängern und Zeitgenossen (Studia Leibnitiana – Supplementa 
27), Stuttgart, 1990, p. 18-29; Mercer, Metaphysics, 101 and “Leibniz and Philosophia 
Reformata” ; R. Bodeüs, “Leibniz, Jean de Raey et la Physique Reformée”, Studia 
Leibnitiana, 23 (1) 1991, p. 103-110. Note the importance of that programme in the two 
authors, but in my view they over-emphasize its restorative aspects as a renewal of 
Aristotelianism: As I hope to show elsewhere, philosophiae reformatio is as progressive a 
conception as philosophia perennis. 
29 Thomasius, Exercitatio 20f., 253. 
30 “Aug. Steuchum tacite perstringit”– Thomasius’s (Exercitatio, 20) comment on 
the quotation following. 
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de perenni philosophia scripserunt”.31 For Leibniz, it seems, Steuco has the 
same prototypical role: For much of his life, he repeatedly mentions De 
philosophia perennis as a standard reference and supports a planned 
reprint.32 While his references to Steuco – in contrast to Thomasius’s – are 
always positive, he gives the Renaissance narrative a decisively progressive 
turn and, in this way, stays faithful to the evolutionary approach to the 
history of philosophy he learned from his teacher. 
The actual term philosophia perennis seems to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in 
Leibniz’s writings;33 we find it in a famous letter written from Vienna in 
August 1714 to the French Platonist Rémond – for whom he was at the 
time writing the Monadology:34 
Truth is much more widespread than one thinks, but it is often in disguise, and often 
also enveloped or even weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions that spoil it 
or make it less useful. By giving attention to these traces of truth among the ancients 
or (to speak more generally) people of former times, one could drag the gold from 
the mud, the diamond out of its mine, light from the shadows; and that would 
indeed be some sort of perennis philosophia.35 
                                                                          
31 Crispo, De ethnicis philosophis, fol. 36, quoted after Thomasius, Exercitatio, 20 (I 
cannot find the passage in Crispo’s book). 
32 Cf. “Johannis Bodini Colloquium Heptaplomeres”, 1668-1669, A VI.2, 137; Ms. 
1669-1670 (?), A VI.1, 532; to Arnauld, November 1671, A II.1 (2006), 282; “Rationale 
fidei catholicae”, 1685 (?), A VI.4 C, 2307; Systema theologicum, 1686 (?), A VI.4 C, 2363; 
to Foucher, July 1686, A II.2, 217; Ms., 1689, A I.5, 431; to Burnett, 1st February 1697, A 
I.13, 547; Theodicy, 1710, Disc. Prélim. 29, G VI, 67. In the 1690s, Leibniz lent his copy of 
Steuco’s De perenni philosophia to the book trader Hoffmann from Celle, who planned a 
partial reprint of the work: Hoffmann to Leibniz, 31st August 1694, A I.10, 541 f; 
Chappuzeau to Leibniz, 5th September 1694, A I.10, 554 f; Hoffmann to Leibniz, 19th 
November 1696, A I.13, 351; cf. G. Utermöhlen, “Die Literatur der Renaissance und des 
Humanismus in Leibniz’ privater Büchersammlung”, in A. Heinekamp (ed.), Leibniz et la 
Renaissance (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 23), Wiesbaden, 1983, p. 225. 
33 H. J. de Vleeschauwer, “Perennis quaedam philosophia. Exégèse et antécédents 
d’un texte leibnizien”, in Akten des Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover, 14-19 
November 1966, Vol. 1, Metaphysik – Monadenlehre (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 1), 
Wiesbaden, 1968, p. 102. 
34 On the chronology cf. E. Pasini, “Cinque storie sulla Monadologia di Leibniz”, in 
B. M. d’Ippolito-A. Montano-F. Piro (eds.), Monadi e monadologie. Il mondo degli 
individui tra Bruno, Leibniz e Husserl, Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Salerno, 
10-12 giugno 2004, Soveria Mannelli, 2005, p. 147-167; M. R. Antognazza, Leibniz. An 
Intellectual Biography, Cambridge, 2009, p. 498-502. 
35 “La verité est plus repandue qu’on ne pense, mais elle est tres souvent fardée, et tres 
souvent aussi enveloppée et même affoiblie, mutilée, corrumpue par des additions qui la 
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The ancient oriental cultures, Leibniz says, made important philosophical 
discoveries and passed them on to the Greeks; the church fathers adapted 
these pagan ideas to Christian premises, and the scholastics continued 
this process – even in their barbarian writings, therefore, could be found 
some aurum in stercore, if anybody was interested in searching for it. 
Perennis quaedam philosophia, “some sort of philosophia perennis”: 
Leibniz’s wording, it has been noted, already marks a certain distance 
from Steuco’s original concept.36 
A few weeks before the letter to Rémond, Leibniz talks more amply 
about the subject: in a lecture presented on the 1st July 1714 to “a certain 
academy in Vienna”.37 The text doesn’t directly cite Steuco, but has 
numerous parallels to his ideas. “How much [in theology] do the Greeks 
owe to the Barbarians, and how much did they themselves add to it?”38 – 
This is the guiding question of Leibniz’s lecture, which in itself reminds the 
reader of Steuco’s discourse.39 At the beginning of the lecture, Leibniz 
briefly mentions how much the Greeks learned from the “Barbarians” in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
gâtent ou la rendent moins utile. En faisant remarquer ces traces de la verité dans les 
anciens ou (pour parler plus generalement) dans les anterieurs, on tiereroit l’or de la boue, 
le diamant de sa mine, et la lumiere de tenebres; et ce seroit en effect perennis quaedam 
Philosophia”. – to Rémond, 24th August 1714, PG III, 624f. 
36 De Vleeschauwer, “Perennis quaedam”, p. 111. 
37 “Recitata in Academia quadam Viennae 1. jul 1714”, P. Riley (ed.), “Leibniz, 
Platonism and Judaism. The 1714 Vienna Lecture on ‘The Greeks as Founders of a Sacred 
Philosophy’”, in D. Cook (ed.), Leibniz und das Judentum (Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft 
34), Wiesbaden, 2008, p. 113. The academia quaedam does not seem to be the actual 
Academy of Sciences, which – projected by Leibniz himself – existed only formally and, in 
spite of his efforts, could not be brought into being (Antognazza, Biography, 494). The 
lecture was first published by Riley in 1976, cf. P. Riley (ed.), “An Unpublished Lecture by 
Leibniz on the Greeks as Founders of Rational Theology”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 14 (2), 1976, p. 205-216. I follow the critical edition Riley published in 2008, Id., 
“Vienna Lecture”. For Riley, this text together with the Monadology and the Principles of 
nature and Grace forms the “Vienna trinity”, the “definitive statement of his final ‘system’”: 
P. Riley, “Leibniz’ ‘Monadologie’ 1714-2014”, The Leibniz Review, 24, 2014, p. 2. 
38 “[...] de Theologia agitur, quaestioque est, quantum in ea debeant Barbaris Graeci, 
quantum ipsi adiecerint” – “Vienna Lecture”, p. 109. 
39 There is indeed a whole chapter dedicated to that question, cf. Steuco, De perenni 
philosophia, 83-85. The original source of the question – cited neither by Leibniz, nor by 
Steuco – seems to be Diog. Laert. I prol. 
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other fields of knowledge, beginning, characteristically enough,40 with the 
“Barbarian” origin of their language. After that, he turns to philosophy.  
The first step in his argument is a differentiation between Natural and 
Revealed Theology: “Natural theology is the one that grows from the seeds 
of truth implanted into minds by God, the creator – just like the other 
sciences. Revealed theology is the one that is taken from the ancients, to 
whom God manifested Himself more closely, and that is spread by 
tradition. Both existed already among the peoples of the East before they 
reached the Greeks”.41 This differentiation, opposed though it is to Steuco 
and the Renaissance tradition of philosophia perennis,42 was of course by no 
means invented by Leibniz: It was already clear to Thomas Aquinas and his 
followers that natural reason was sufficient to know about certain key 
doctrines of Christianity such as monotheism and the immortality of the 
soul; faith in a Divine revelation was required only for doctrines referring 
to the inner essence of God (Trinity) and His contingent decisions 
(Creation, Incarnation, Eschatology).43 In a certain sense, Leibniz in this 
point does little more than to restore the scientific sobriety of 
Scholasticism against the exuberant Renaissance pathos. But this 
                                                                          
40 On Leibniz’s interest in the history of languages cf. K. D. Dutz, “‘Lingua adamica 
nobis certe ignota est’. Die Sprachursprungsdebatte und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”, in J. 
Gessinger-W. von Rahden (eds.), Theorien vom Ursprung der Sprache, 2 vols., Berlin, 1989, 
vol. 1, p. 204-240.  
41 “Theologia naturalis est, quae ex seminibus veritatis menti a Deo autore inditis 
enascitur ad caeterarum scientiarum instar. Revelata est quae ab antiquis hausta quibus 
Deus se manifestaverat familiarius, et traditione propagata est. Utraque apud Orientis 
populos extitit antequam ad Graecos perveniret” – “Vienna Lecture”, p. 109. 
42 This gap between reason and faith, even greater in Renaissance Aristotelianism, 
was one of the things Ficino’s pia philosophia wished to overcome: Di Napoli, 
“Philosophia perennis”, p. 464-472. 
43 Cf. J. A. Brent, “Natural Theology”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/theo-nat/> (retrieved 23rd August 2019); for Aquinas e.g. 
Summa theologiae I, 12.4/12, 12/32.1/46.2, ed. Leon. IV, 120/136/349f./481. In 
Lutheran theology – whose starting point was Luther’s fierce criticism of philosophy – a 
similar assessment of the role of reason was not unanimously accepted, but possible (Jacob 
Schegk, Nicolaus Taurellus), cf. G. Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. 
Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit (Quaestiones 13), Stuttgart, 2003, esp. 
p. 54-57, 111-119, 142f.; P. Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im 
protestantischen Deutschland, Leipzig, 1921, p. 63 and 272. The importance of Natural 
Theology in Leibniz’s philosophical project is underlined by Widmaier, “Eine ‘gewisse’ 
Philosophia perennis”, p. 582-586. Leibniz cites Thomas Aquinas in this context in 
Discours sur la Theologie naturelle des Chinois, ed. W. Li, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, p. 51.  
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conventional premise, we will see, leads him not only to a conception of 
intellectual history totally different from Steuco’s, but also to a 
reassessment of the role of Reason in comparison to Faith unthinkable to 
traditional Christianity. 
Like Steuco, Leibniz now affirms that the doctrine of the immortality 
of souls was brought by Pythagoras to Greece and Italy from the East – a 
motive that he mentions in other contexts as well from the 1690s on.44 But 
for him, this does not prove the origin of this tenet in the primordial 
revelation witnessed by Adam: It belongs to natural, not to revealed, 
theology, grows out of the semina veritatis shared by all the humans, and 
not only those who had the chance to talk to Methuselah. The revelation 
of God to Adam, Abraham, and the Hebrews, therefore, is not the only 
source of philosophy in the world. “I do not want to fight with anyone 
whether Pythagoras and Plato learned anything from the Hebrews”, he 
writes to Hansch in 1707 – “until now, I have found nothing that would 
persuade me of the fact”.45 The Augustinian monk Bonjour’s 1696 attempt 
to prove the identity of Hermes Trismegistus with the Hebrew patriarch 
Joseph does not convince Leibniz: “I have often believed that people are a 
bit too generous when finding the fables of the ancients in the Holy 
Scriptures”.46 And Pierre Daniel Huet’s reading of classical Greek and 
Roman mythology as a distorted version of Christian revelation47 reminds 
him of “the alchemists, who find the Philosopher’s Stone in the Holy 
Scripture as well as in Ovid’s Metamorphoses”.48  
                                                                          
44 To Fardella, 3rd September 1696, A II.3, 192 f; for Electress Sophia and Duchess 
Elizabeth Charlotte, October 1696, A I. 13, 47; to Hansch, 25th July 1707, Dutens II, 
222-223; to Rémond, 24th August 1714, PG III, 624 f (see above). 
45 “Utrum ab Hebraeis aliquid didicerint Pythagoras et Plato, cum nemine litigare 
velim; hactenus, quod id credi suadeat, non animadverti”– to Hansch, 25th July 1707, 
Dutens II, 222-223, cf. Riley, “Vienna Lecture”, p. 96. 
46 “j’ay souvent cru, qu’on est un peu trop liberal à tirer les fables des anciens de la 
Sainte Écriture” – to Spanheim, 27th April 1697, A I.14, 159. 
47 C. Ligota, “Der apologetische Rahmen der Mythendeutung im Frankreich des 17. 
Jahrhunderts (P. D. Huet)” in W. Killy (ed.), Mythographie in der frühen Neuzeit. Ihre 
Anwendung in den Künsten (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 27), Wiesbaden, 1984. 
48 “Ces Hypotheses […] me paroissent semblables à celles des Chymistes, qui 
trouvent la pierre philosophale dans la sainte écriture aussi bien que dans les 
Metamorphoses d’Ovide” – to Spanheim, 27th April 1697, A I.14, 159, cf. Widmaier, 
“Eine ‘gewisse’ philosophia perennis”, p. 593 n. 50. 
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In his Vienna Lecture, therefore, Leibniz sees important theological 
discoveries also amongst peoples that were by no means connected to Old 
Testament revelation: The immortality of the souls, he reads in Strabo and 
Cesar, was known also to the ancient Druids and Brahmins, and as Leibniz 
learns from the more recent Danish scholar Bartholin, the Nordic people 
with their Valhalla myth also knew about it. Likewise, the belief that the 
world was created by one God is also a central tenet of traditional Chinese 
philosophy, if one only interprets it correctly. In addition, the Greeks also 
knew some fragments of the revealed theology, as handed down by the 
Hebrews: Thales knows – as does the Bible – that water was the first 
element on the face of the earth; the legend of Prometheus relates how man 
was created from clay; Greeks and Romans knew about the deluge; the 
Stoics predicted the world would end in fire. Like Huet and other scholars, 
Leibniz believes that Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, the three sons of 
Saturnus, can be identified with the biblical three sons of Noah:49 Ham 
dishonoured his father Noah by “seeing his nakedness”,50 while Jupiter 
castrated his father Saturnus. Finally, Pythagoras attributed the number 
three to God, and thus seems to have known something of the Trinitarian 
dogma – which at that time could not be known from the sacred texts, but 
only from the oral tradition of the Hebrews: Here, for a fleeting moment, 
Leibniz becomes a Kabbalist.51 
Because all the important truths both of Natural and Revealed 
Theology, therefore, were already contained in Barbarian wisdom, the 
Greeks didn’t actually have any new tenets to find and, with respect to 
Revealed Theology, corrupted rather than enhanced what had been handed 
down to them.52 That does not mean, however, that they didn’t contribute 
anything to the intellectual history of mankind – on the contrary: We owe 
to them the origin of philosophy as a science. 
And even though I doubt that the Greeks found anything actually new in theology, I 
believe that they expressed several things more distinctly, which the Orientals had 
                                                                          
49 Cf. S. Waldhoff, “Zwischen Polytheismus und natürlicher Theologie – Leibniz’ 
Interpretation des antiken Heidentums in seinem Wiener Vortrag von 1714”, Studia 
Leibnitiana 36 (1), 2004, p. 101f.  
50 Cf. Gen. 9, 21-27. 
51 “Vienna Lecture”, p. 109-113. 
52 Waldhoff, “Polytheismus”, p. 105-107 emphasizes this point. 
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handed down to them in a more obscure manner. The most important aspect of this 
is the doctrine of incorporeal substances. While Moses spoke about God in such a 
manner that it is sufficiently clear that he had put this supreme being (that said 
about itself sum qui sum, the fountain of essence) beyond all contact to corporeal 
things – but he did not express such a truth in a scholarly manner, as a dogma. About 
the souls, as well, the Orientals did not talk in such a way that it was clear that they 
should be immaterial. For the oriental sages accommodated themselves to popular 
similes and were content to teach that there was one supreme creator of things, and 
perfectly just ruler of the souls, and did not philosophize sufficiently about the 
nature of God and the souls – the Greeks on the other hand, as far as we know, were 
the first to come forward with some metaphysical philosophy and to deal with the 
incorporeal substances in God and the other minds in a scholarly manner.53 
This, according to Leibniz, was achieved by Pythagoras and Anaxagoras, 
but most of all by Plato and Aristotle. And though it is probable that none 
of them added anything genuinely “new” to “Barbarian” thought, they 
turned what the ancients had expressed through obscure imagery into a 
scientific system.  
Coming to a conclusion, therefore, one must say that we owe to the Barbarians great 
truths concerning the divine things, to the Greeks, on the other hand, a certain 
sacred philosophy, which does not only explicate the nature of the divine and 
spiritual things more expressly, but also demonstrates them with illustrious 
arguments. In order to instruct mankind – at that time more rough, less cultivated 
by the doctrines of the several disciplines – through the revelations made to the 
prophets, God used especially the Hebrew people as an instrument; but afterwards, 
he established a new light for the human race by pouring a zeal for wisdom into the 
minds of the Greeks, so that they could shield the divine truths with reliable 
                                                                          
53 “Etsi autem dubitem an quicquam plane novum in Theologia invenerint Graeci, 
puto tamen quaedam ab orientalibus prolata obscurius, a Graecis distinctius fuisse expressa. 
Potissimum autem horum est doctrina de substantiis incorporalibus. Equidem Moses de 
Deo ita locutus est, ut satis appareat, Summum illud, quod de se dixit sum qui sum, fontem 
essentiae, ab omni corporis contagio removisse, sed diserte tamen in dogmatis modum, 
tantam veritatem non expressit. De Animabus etiam orientales ita locuti non sunt, ut 
immateriales esse constaret. Nempe sapientes in oriente popularibus sese imaginibus 
accomodabant, contentique docere unum summum rerum autorem, animarumque 
iustissimum rectorem, de ipsa Dei animaeque natura non satis philosophabantur. At Graeci 
primi quantum constat quandem Metaphysicam protulere et substantias incorporeas in Deo 
et Mentibus caeteris diserte agnovere”. – “Vienna Lecture”, p. 113. 
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demonstrations against all doubts, arising among the humans, who in the course of 
the centuries were to advance to greater subtilities of thought.54 
While Leibniz defended the ‘revealed’ aspects of Christian theology 
throughout his life,55 he often somewhat marginalized them;56 Christ seems 
to appear first and foremost as a teacher and lawgiver rather than as the 
incarnate God and Redeemer.57 The Vienna Lecture follows this pattern: 
Divine revelation, in this text, is only the preliminary means by which God 
instructs mankind. The primary form of knowledge, which He in the end 
wants to flourish among men, is that of natural reason i.e. the semina 
veritatis with which every human mind is endowed, and which – first 
among the Greeks – had to be developed into systematic reasoning. The 
Greeks, we heard, were the first to speak about metaphysical matters 
diserte: in a methodical, well-structured, scholarly manner. Or, as we read 
in the letter addressed to Rémond (see above): “The Greeks added 
reasoning and the form of a science”.58 Only this could show in their full 
glory the truths already discovered by the Barbarians. 
Mankind “in the course of the centuries [was] to advance to greater 
subtilities of thought”, Leibniz says at the end of his lecture, and – just as 
he saw it in his own time59 – was to experience and overcome “doubts” 
about metaphysical matters born precisely from this progress. Plato and 
                                                                          
54 “Itaque, ut concludam, dicendum est, Barbaris quidem Veritates maximas circa 
divina deberi, Graecis autem Philosophiam quandam sacram, qua rerum divinarum et 
Spiritualium natura non explicatur tantum epressius, sed etiam praeclaris rationibus 
demonstratur. Ut adeo DEUS pro summa providentia homines adhuc rudiores, minusque 
disciplinarum praeceptis excultos per prophetarum revelationes erudierit Hebraica 
imprimis gente usus, tamquam instrumento; sed postea novum lumen generi humano 
accenderit sapientiae studio Graecorum mentibus infuso, ut divinae veritates contra 
omnes, hominum ad maiorem cogitandi subtilitatem seculorum progressu 
provehendorum dubitationes, certis demonstrationibus communierentur”. – ibid., p. 113. 
55 M. R. Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation. Reason and 
Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Gerald Parks, New Haven/London, 2007. 
56 W. Schmidt-Biggemann, “Die Rationalität des Christentums. Leibniz als 
Theologe”, in Thomas A. C. Reydon-Helmut Heit-Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Der 
universale Leibniz. Denker, Forscher, Erfinder, Stuttgart, 2009, p. 51-62. 
57 Discourse on Metaphysics, 37, A VI.4 B 1587-1588; Theodicy, Préface, G VI, 25-27. 
58 “les Grecs y ont adjouté le raisonnement et une forme de science”, to Rémond, 
24th August 1714, PG III, 625. 
59 Cf. his ambivalent assessment of his own seculum philosophicum in his early letter 
to Arnauld, A II.1 (2006), 277. 
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Aristotle, it seems, are not the final point of the development of human 
intellect. If we now leave the Vienna Lecture and turn to other texts, we 
will see that the kind of progress that Leibniz imagines beyond the 
antiquity and, indeed, beyond his own time, consists in precisely what the 
Greeks themselves had applied to Barbarian thought – that is, more 
systematic reasoning.  
In his own time, Leibniz observed, people with a mathematical 
mindset were not usually inclined to metaphysics – the lack of clarity in its 
definitions deterred them. In spite of so many fruitful trials by Plato, 
Aristotle, Descartes, and others, a metaphysical science is now, as it was in 
the time of Aristotle, ζητουμένη: A desideratum.60 The ancients, therefore, 
did no more than construct an incunabula veritatis, a cradle of truth, thus 
paving the way for further progress within the discipline.61 “I would like to 
know who will first give us a metaphysics rendered into a systematic 
discipline [in artem redactam]. For Aristotle collected but the material for 
it, and his scholastic commentators did not establish a system”.62 
In the same way, therefore, that Aristotle and Plato made the first 
efforts to “build a system” out of the “materials” Pythagoras brought from 
Egypt, their writings must now in turn serve as the material for a new kind 
of metaphysics, one whose methodological standards Leibniz wanted to 
model after the example of mathematics. Thus he frequently suggested that 
older philosophical texts should be brought into a scientific system, so that 
the truth they contained would be shown more clearly. A learned 
clergyman, for example, could do that with the scholastic authors,63 a 
Platonist with the philosophy of Plato,64 everyone according to their 
personal inclination.65 It was in this context that Leibniz welcomed his 
Roman acquaintance Michelangelo Fardella’s preparations for a book on 
St. Augustine (he was utterly disappointed with Fardella’s actual result): 
                                                                          
60 De Primae Philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae, 1694, PG IV, 
468-70; with reference to Arist. Met. I.2, 983 a 21; similarly in 982 a4; b8. 
61 To Fardella, 3rd September 1696, A II.3, 192f. 
62 “Vellem nosse, quis primus nobis Metaphysicam in artem redactam dederit. 
Aristoteles enim non nisi materiam comportavit et commentatores eius scholastici nullum 
systema condiderunt” – to Bierling, 20th June 1712, PG VII, 506. 
63 To Fardella, 28th February 1696, A II.3, 536. 
64 To Rémond, 10th January 1714 / 11th February 1715, PG III 605 / 637. 
65 To Rémond, 26th August 1714, PG III, 625. 
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Fardella’s text, as he saw it, would serve as an opportunity to promote true 
philosophy, simply by shaping the thought of the church father into 
scientific order.66 
A striking example of how Leibniz imagines such an engagement with 
ancient philosophy is his treatment of Chinese thought. Emperor Fuxi’s 
supposed invention of the binary numeral system, he writes in the Vienna 
Lecture, proves that he knew about the creation of the world out of 
nothing: The number 1 would signify the unity, or God, the number 0 
nothing.67 The following year Rémond gave Leibniz the opportunity to 
engage more amply with Chinese philosophy:68 He sent him a tract by the 
Jesuit missionary Niccolò Longobardi († 1655), who had come to the 
conclusion that Confucianist texts promote a largely materialistic 
philosophy diametrically opposed to Christian Natural Theology – 
Longobardi here contradicted both the official policy of his order and 
Leibniz’s conception of philosophia perennis. In this context Longobardi, 
for example, identified the principle Li, the origin of everything in the 
world, with the “prime matter” of Scholastic terminology. Commenting on 
the tract, Leibniz now tried to prove that Li was rather to be understood as 
the “first form” – in whose essence all the created “Entelechies, Souls, 
Spirits” (we recognize the terminology of the Monadology!) participated 
and which could therefore safely be identified with the Christian God. The 
prime matter, on the other hand, should be identified with a second 
principle, Ki which, according to Leibniz’s interpretation of the ancient 
texts, had been created by Li i.e. God.69 Leibniz admits that this 
interpretation is opposed to that of many Chinese authors – but is it not 
                                                                          
66 To Fardella, 3rd September 1696, A II.3, 192 f, cf. ibid., LVII-LXI. 
67 Cf. R. Widmaier, “Die Rolle der Dyadik in Leibniz’ Missionstheorie für China” in 
B. Hoster-D. Kuhlmann-Z. Weselowski (eds.), Rooted in Hope. China – Religion – 
Christianity. In der Hoffnung verwurzelt. China – Religion – Christentum (Monumenta 
Serica Monograph Series LXVIII/1), Sankt Augustin, 2017, p. 277-310; Ead., “Die Dyadik 
in Leibniz’ letztem Brief an Nicolas Remond”, Studia Leibnitiana, 49 (2), 2017, p. 139-
176; Ead., “Natürliche Theologie und Philosophia perennis. Leibniz’ Interpretation der 
alten und modernen chinesischen Philosophie in der Abhandlung Niccolò Longobardis 
S.J.”, in W. Li et al., Für unser Glück VI, p. 781-806. 
68 W. Li, “Leibniz’ Discours sur la théologie naturelle de chinois. Entstehung, 
Editionen und Übersetzungen”, in Id., Leibniz and the European Encounter with China: 
300 Years of “Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois” (Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft 
52),f.Stuttgart, 2017, p. 17-36; Widmaier, “Longobardi”. 
69 Discours sur la Theologie naturelle des Chinois, ed. Li, p. 47-51.  
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possible that an erudite European understands the Chinese classics better 
than the Chinese themselves? Also the ancient Hebrew writings, Leibniz 
argues, are better understood by the Christians than by the Jews, and often 
the monuments and history of a nation are best known to foreigners.70 
Leibniz’s strongest argument for his own interpretation are not the 
enigmatic and fragmentary second-hand quotations from the Chinese 
classics that he draws from Longobardi’s and other Jesuit tracts: His own 
superior knowledge of the Divine truths, based on the systematic 
philosophical method only available in the occident, convinces him that his 
interpretation must be the original and true meaning of the classical texts.71 
How much philosophy were the ancient “barbarians” able to offer to 
the Greek (and our) world? Leibniz’s answer to this guiding question of his 
1714 Vienna Lecture is a paradox: The ancient peoples knew everything – 
and nothing. For those who know to ‘read’ their ideas properly, the 
Chinese and the Druids held roughly the right opinions about God and the 
human soul. But a true philosopher is not someone who has true opinions 
– he is someone who knows how to find these opinions in a systematic 
manner and to prove then irrefutably. Only from this superior point of 
view can one actually ‘read’ the truths contained in the thought of the 
ancients. This aim, in Leibniz’s opinion, was not attained by the old 
barbarians, nor was it attained by the Greeks or, indeed, Leibniz’s 
contemporaries (he would not think much differently about the year 
2019). Leibniz’s suggestion to bring the ancient philosophies into a 
systematic order is therefore not merely a matter of pedantry or 
pedagogical convenience: Systematizing the teaching of the I Ching or of 
De trinitate means turning opinion into philosophy. 
                                                                          
70 De cultu Confucii civili, A IV.8, 397 f; cf. A. Heinekamp, “Die Rolle der 
Philosophiegeschichte in Leibniz’ Denken” in Id., Leibniz als Geschichtsforscher, 
Symposion des Istituto di Studi Filosofici Enrico Castelli und der Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 
Ferrara, 12. bis 15. Juni 1980, Wiesbaden, 1982, p. 114-141: 125. 
71 Cf. his emphasis on our ignorance (and therefore freedom of interpretation) of 
Chinese philosophy in his earlier letter to des Bosses, 12th August 1709, G II, 382-83; cf. 
R. Widmaier (ed.), Briefe über China (1694-1716): die Korrespondenz mit Barthélemy des 
Bosses S.J. und anderen Mitgliedern des Ordens, Hamburg, 2017, p. 116-123; preface to 
the Novissima Sinica, 1697-99, § 9, ibid., 14-17, and Widmaier’s introduction ibid., 
CXXIV-CXXVII. Widmaier also, referring to the Vienna Lecture, emphasizes the 
revelational source of Leibniz’s superior knowledge (ibid., CLXf.); the auxiliary function 
of revelation in the Vienna Lecture’s narrative relativizes this. 
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For a relational thinker like Leibniz, Hippocrates’ σύμπνοια πάντα72 
applies also to the different “modules”73 of his philosophical system: 
Everything is connected to everything. His conception of the history of 
philosophy, his ambivalent and dialectical assessment of ancient wisdom, is 
deeply rooted in his epistemology and metaphysics.74 Just like the ancient 
Barbarians, we all know (in a certain sense) everything already – and yet 
still we are limited in our knowledge. Each monad, Leibniz famously writes 
while pondering the Vienna Lecture, is a “perpetual living mirror of the 
universe”.75 Monads, therefore, are not limited “as regards their object, but 
as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object 
[…]. In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they 
are limited and differentiated by the degrees of their distinct perceptions”.76 
These “degrees of their distinct perceptions” determine what a monad 
actually knows: “a soul can read in itself only that which is there 
represented distinctly”.77 Nobody, therefore, can ever learn anything 
actually new; learning rather means becoming aware of the petites 
perceptions78 one has not “distinctly” noticed so far, but that have always 
been, readable to God, in one’s soul. The progress from obscure to adequate 
cognition, the 1684 Meditationes argue, is nothing more than a continuous 
analysis making explicit what the former already implied; “the ideas of 
                                                                          
72 Monadology 61. 
73 D. Garber, “Thinking in the Age of the Learned Journal. Leibniz’s Modular 
Philosophy”, in Li et al., Für unser Glück VI, p. 195-204. 
74 What I am going to say in this and the following two paragraphs has a somewhat 
controversial presupposition i.e. that there is an essential continuity from the 1680s on in 
Leibniz’s thought about the matters I am referring to. Obviously, I cannot argue for this 
view of Leibniz’s philosophy in the framework of this article (for the contrary view, cf. D. 
Garber, “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: the Middle Years”, in K. Okruhlik-J. R. 
Brown, The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz, Dordrecht, 1985; Id., Leibniz: Body, Substance, 
Monad, Oxford, 2009). 
75 “un miroir vivant perpetual de l’univers”, Monadology 56 (G VI, 616, trans. Latta, 
p. 248).  
76 “Ce n’est pas dans l’objet, mais dans la modification de la connaissance de l’objet 
que les monades sont bornées. Elles vont toutes confusément à l’infini, au tout, mais elles 
sont limitées et distinguées par les degrés des perceptions distinctes”, Monadology 60 (G 
VI, 617, trans. Latta p. 250). 
77 “une ame ne peut lire en elle-même que ce qui y est représenté distinctement”, 
Monadology 61 (G VI, 617 trans. Latta, p. 251). 
78 Nouveaux Essais, Préf., A VI.6, 53-55; Monadology 21, G VI, 610. 
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things […] are in our mind as the statue of Hercules is in the raw marble”.79 
If mankind followed Leibniz’s suggestion to dig the “gold” and “diamonds” 
of true philosophy out of the “mud” of ancient texts, it would do the same 
thing as any individual learner does when working the “statue” of the idea 
out of the “marble” of their mind. Perpetual progress in this process is what 
man is called to – both as an individual and as a species. 
Progress thus consists in the rearrangement of knowledge that 
mankind already has. As a geometrical analogy for this process Leibniz 
frequently alludes to the spiral: a figure that combines cyclical repetition 
and eternal progress. Like a spiral, human history often declines in order to 
ascend again. As in a spiral, individuals, events, and scientific propositions 
will repeat themselves in history again and again – but they will repeat their 
circular movement each time on a ‘higher’ level; the universe will grow in 
perfection each time, in particular with respect to the human intellect. 
While the logical elements of the knowledge of mankind cannot increase in 
number and must necessarily repeat themselves, mankind will be able to 
combine them into ever more complex propositions and thus make ever 
more sense data subject to rational analysis. Sense data is infinite, and thus 
this progress will never come to an end: Mankind will never reach perfect 
truth – but has always possessed all the elements it consists of. 80 
Why is that so? Creatures, in Leibniz’s metaphysics, have a 
characteristic middle position in the hierarchy of being. Their origin is 
“God and nothing, the positive and the privative, perfection and 
imperfection, force and limitation, the active and the passive, form […] and 
                                                                          
79 “rerum vero actu a nobis non cogitatarum ideae sunt in mente nostra, ut figura 
Herculis in rudi marmore”, Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684), A VI.4 A, 
591, cf. T. Leinkauf, “Leibniz’ Abhandlung Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis von 
1684. Eine Diskussion erkenntnistheoretischer Grundprobeme mit Blick auf den 
Tractatus de intellectus emendatione des Baruch de Spinoza”, in Id., Einheit, Natur, Geist. 
Beiträge zu metaphysischen Grundproblemen im Denken von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
Berlin, 2012, p. 269-289. 
80 Demonstrationes de universo (1700)/Ἀποκατάστασις (1715) in M. Fichant 
(ed./trans.), De l’horizon de la doctrine humaine (1693). Ἀποκατάστασις πάντων (1715), 
Paris, 1991, 56-61/66-77. Cf. the other manuscripts Michel Fichant assembled in that 
volume. The spiral with the motto Inclinata resurget was one of the symbols of eternal life 
that Leibniz’s secretary Eckhart ordered to depict on Leibniz’s coffin: Antognazza, 
Biography, p. 545. 
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matter”.81 They resemble God – for He is the only principle of being; but 
they differ from Him by the limits each of them has. If such limits did not 
exist, the creature would become actus purus like God himself, thus a 
second almighty God – which is impossible.82 If, on the other hand, they 
shared none of God’s predicates, they would have no being at all. They are, 
therefore, “confusedly omniscient and in a broken way almighty”.83 In the 
“best of the possible worlds” – what sort of fate can God have envisaged for 
these ambiguous beings? “Our happiness will never consist, and ought not 
to consist, in a complete enjoyment, in which there would be nothing left 
to desire, and which would make our mind dull, but in a perpetual progress 
to new pleasures and new perfections”84 – not even the eternal life after 
death can be imagined as a static pleasure,85 and the universe “always grows 
in perfection”.86 Leibniz’s activities as a statesman, scientist and 
philosopher can be read as a contribution to this cosmic process, of which 
philosophia perennis, the ever-deeper knowledge about God and the 
Immaterial Substances, is the keystone.87 
In spite of all their differences, therefore, Leibniz can subscribe to the 
opening sentence of Steuco’s work: “As there is one origin of all things, so 
there has always and amongst all men been the same lore about this 
                                                                          
81 “ex Deo et nihilo, positivo et privativo, perfectione et imperfectione, valore et 
limitibus, activo et passivo, forma […] et materia seu mole”– to Schulenburg, 29 March 
1698, A II.3, 426s. 
82 To des Bosses, 16th October 1706, G II, 324. 
83 “omniscia confuse et omnipotens refracte”, Mira de substantia corporea (1683), A 
VI.4 B, 1465 s. 
84 “Ainsi notre bonheur ne consistera jamais, et ne doit point consister dans une 
pleine jouissance, où il n’y auroit plus rien à desirer, et qui rendroit notre esprit stupide, 
mais dans un progrès perpetual à de nouveaux plaisirs et de nouvelles perfections”– 
Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison 18, G VI, 606, trans. after M. Morris-G. 
H. R. Parkinson, Philosophical Writings, London, 1984, p. 203f; cf. D. Rutherford, 
Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge, 1995, p. 54.  
85 Several citations cf. W. Hübener, “Leibniz – ein Geschichtsphilosoph?”, in 
Heinekamp, Geschichtsforscher, p. 46. 
86 Ms., 1694-96 (?), G. Grua, (ed.), Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la 
Bibliothèque Provinciale de Hanovre, 2 vols., Paris, 1948, p.95. 
87 On Leibniz’s “philosophy of history” – fragmentary and partly contradictory, but 
clear in its outline – cf. J. Elster, Leibniz et la formation de l’esprit capitaliste, Paris, 1975, p. 
205-238; Hübener, “Geschichtsphilosoph”; A. Seifert, “Neuzeitbewußtsein und 
Fortschrittsgedanke bei Leibniz” in Heinekamp, Geschichtsforscher, p. 172-185. 
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origin”.88 For both Steuco and Leibniz, philosophia perennis is of Divine 
origin, and this origin shapes its historical character. For Steuco, philosophia 
perennis is ever declining (or used to be until the arrival of Christ), because it 
is the relic of a primordial revelation by the Creator; for Leibniz, philosophia 
perennis is ever growing, because philosophers (like all beings) strive to more 
and more resemble God, in whose essence all things participate and who 
“moves” the universe “like something desired” by it.89 What humans try to 
work out of the hard “marble” of their minds, where it is already invisibly 
enclosed, is nothing else than the “ideas” that God sees; it is God who 
“implanted the seeds of truth into the minds”. Leibniz’s “light of reason”, 
even if “natural” and not supernatural, is Divine, for it is a reflex of the 
“continual flashes of lightning from the Divinity in each moment”.90 
Leibniz, we have seen, shares a central motive of Steuco’s 
historiography of philosophy: Greek philosophy has an oriental and 
ancient origin and arrived in the occident only thanks to the mediation of 
the Egyptians. The context, however, in which the two authors affirm this 
idea, is very different. In Leibniz, we do not find Steuco’s “conservative” 
idea that mankind has always followed the same ideas that we ‘now’ – in 
the 16th or 17th century – know to be true. What the philosopher from 
Leipzig has in mind is rather an evolutionist conception of the history of 
philosophy – a proto-Hegelian one, we might say: Already the most 
primitive movements of the human mind contain, implicitly, the truth in 
its entirety – but true philosophy does not consist in these unnoticed 
petites perceptions, but in their development into a scientific system in the 
                                                                          
88 “Ut unum est omnium rerum principium, sic unam atque eandem de eo scientiam 
semper apud omnes fuisse” – Steuco, De perennis philosophia, 1. Cf. de Vleeschauwer, 
“Perennis quaedam”, p. 121: “La doctrine chrétienne était perennis pour Steucho, parce 
qu’elle formule sa sagesse éternelle révelée originellement par Dieu ; la métaphysique 
monadique leibnizienne est perennis, parce qu’elle formule l’idée créatrice de l’univers”.  
89 “movet sicut desideratum”: Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I.20 after 
Arist. Met. XII 7, A 1072a 26. 
90 “Fulgurations continuelles de la Divinité de moment en moment” – Monadology 
47, G VI, 614. The central role of this and other instances where Leibniz uses the 
metaphor of light has been noted by H. Busche, “Monade und Licht: die geheime 
Verbindung von Physik und Metaphysik bei Leibniz”, in C. Bohlmann (ed.), Lichtgefüge 
des 17. Jahrhunderts. Rembrandt und Vermeer – Spinoza und Leibniz, München, 2008, p. 




course of a historical process: “The true is the whole”; it must 
“consummat[e] itself through its development”.91 The philosopher’s task, 
then, is to let the semina veritatis grow into plants – that is: to lead to full 
light their hidden implications. In this respect, for Leibniz, the historian of 
philosophy is in the fullest sense of the word a philosopher.  
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